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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 07, 1998, the Daimler-Benz AG and the Chrysler Corporation merged into the Daim-
lerChrysler AG, one of the world’s biggest car manufacturers with 442,000 employees and a
market value of about $100 billion. The former Daimler Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Jür-
gen Schrempp, promised huge synergy savings in distribution, product design, and research &
development. Leading newspapers were less optimistic. On the day following the merger, the
New York Times stated that "at a news conference held here to proclaim the biggest industrial
marriage in history, neither company could explain in detail where billions of dollars in sav-
ings from reduced expenses would come from" (Andrews 1998). In 2001, these fears were
confirmed by the actual course of events—the market value of DaimlerChrysler shrank to $44
billion, which was nearly the pre-merger market value of the Daimler-Benz AG alone. Thus,
synergies either remained unexploited or did not exist.1
Nevertheless, the merger had one clear winner—the 1998 Daimler CEO and later Daimler-
Chrysler CEO Jürgen Schrempp. Before merging, his estimated yearly income amounted to
$2.9 million. After merging, the pay system for top executives at Daimler-Benz changed dra-
matically: at least 70 percent of top executive compensation became performance bonuses and
other incentive payments (Bryant 1999). As a consequence, the new estimated income of Jürgen
Schrempp (at least) doubled. There does not only exist anecdotal evidence for the observation
that the income of an acquiring firm’s CEO rises considerably—even after a merger that leads
to low or no synergies. The empirical results of Bliss and Rosen (2001), Anderson et al. (2004),
Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005), Girma et al. (2006), Harford and
Li (2007), and Guest (2009) show that this observation can be considered as a stylized fact.2
With acquisitions leading to higher CEO compensation, an immediately related question is
how the anticipation of this positive income effect affects the quality of acquisition decisions.
In the following, we offer a rationale for why CEOs prefer low-synergy mergers over high-
synergy mergers, and how they benefit from poor merger quality. We consider a two-stage
principal-agent relationship between a CEO, on the one hand, and the board of directors or the
shareholders—henceforth summarized as the "principal"—on the other. The CEO is protected
by limited liability. In line with the observation in Anderson et al. (2004) that changes in CEO
compensation following a merger are likely to reflect a restructuring of incentives, we assume
this principal-agent relationship to be governed by a series of short-term contracts. In the first
stage, the CEO gathers information on possible merger targets and recommends a target to the
principal. At the end of the first stage, the principal decides on whether to acquire the target firm
or not. In the second stage, in case of merging, the CEO is employed to manage the merged
firm. At this stage, the principal can optimally fine-tune CEO incentives by using bonuses
1As the article "Dark Days at Daimler" published in BusinessWeek on August 15, 2005, put it: "Chrysler proved
to be a massive rescue job that sucked up billions and absorbed German management for years [...]. Synergies
have been few and far between."
2See Williams et al. (2008) for a literature survey.
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that depend on the CEO’s performance. Our analysis shows that if a CEO identifies both low-
and high-synergy targets, he will tend to recommend a low-synergy one to make the principal
choose high-powered incentives at the merger-management stage, yielding a large rent to the
CEO. This result, providing one possible explanation for the low synergies from the Daimler-
Chrysler merger, sheds light on how CEOs can manipulate their post-merger remuneration by
making opportunistic merger recommendations. Besides the case of Daimler-Chrysler, there
exists broad empirical evidence that merging often leads to poor or disastrous outcomes (e.g.,
Jensen and Ruback 1983, Jarrell et al. 1988, Bradley et al. 1988, Morck et al. 1990, Bruner
2005). This empirical literature is in line with our theoretical findings.
Regarding the CEO’s recommendation of a merger target, we focus on decision-based incen-
tives throughout the paper: while the synergies of the recommended target firm are verifiable for
the principal, CEO pay in the first stage can only condition on the fact whether an acquisition
takes place or not.3 We find that the principal may benefit from offering the CEO a sufficiently
high wage premium in case of an acquisition, although the quality of the CEO’s recommen-
dation of a merger target is not contractible. Offering a large acquisition premium acts as a
commitment device for the principal not to approve low-synergy recommendations because
low-synergy targets will not justify the high CEO pay. Consequently, the CEO is kept from
opportunistically recommending a low-synergy merger target while identifying high-synergy
targets at the same time.
In practice, CEOs often bear personal costs from merging (e.g., traveling between the head-
quarter and the newly acquired firm). The principal may be able to influence these costs (e.g.,
the frequency of traveling) and include them in the contractual terms offered to the CEO. In
this case, it may be optimal to impose sufficiently high costs on the CEO to reduce his rents
from a low-synergy merger and, thereby, influence his recommendation of merger targets. This
rent-reduction strategy, however, leads to lower expected profits for the principal in case of a
high-synergy merger because of a binding participation constraint of the CEO. We summarize
conditions under which influencing the CEO’s recommendation via endogenous personal costs
is more profitable for the principal than the commitment solution described in the previous
paragraph.
In a final step, we assume that information gathering by the CEO is endogenous. If the CEO
exerts costly effort in the first stage of the game, he increases the number of target firms whose
synergies he may then learn about. In this situation of repeated moral hazard, prospective rents
from merger management in the second stage create implicit incentives for the CEO to gather
information in the first stage. Information gathering can further be motivated by a first-period
wage premium in case of acquisition of a target firm. We show that if the probability of detecting
a low-synergy target and the principal’s relative profit loss from opportunistic recommendation
3The incomplete contracting assumption of decision-based rewards was introduced by Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999). According to this approach, incentive schemes condition on actual decisions but not on the content or
quality of the information underlying these decisions.
3
are sufficiently large, the principal will benefit from disincentivizing the CEO by offering a
premium for not recommending a merger target in the first stage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a review of the related literature in
Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce our basic model, which is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5
discusses several modifications of the basic model to check the robustness of our main finding.
We conclude in Section 6. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Besides the empirical work on post-merger CEO pay cited above, our paper is related to part of
the merger literature that explains why CEOs sometimes choose merger targets with low syner-
gies.4 First, CEOs may receive a utility from empire building (e.g., higher prestige) and ignore
synergies (Baumol 1959, Marris 1963, Williamson 1963, Jensen 1986). Second, overconfident
CEOs may imagine to measure the true value of a target firm more precisely than the whole
capital market, leading to the well-known hubris effect (Roll 1986). Third, CEOs may prefer
to invest in those industries in which they are experts in order to entrench themselves (Shleifer
and Vishny 1989). Fourth, a raider may decide to acquire a target firm to benefit from a breach
of implicit contracts with the workforce and other stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers 1988,
Schnitzer 1995, Brusco 1996). Finally, a risk averse CEO of an acquiring firm may benefit from
the diversification of personal risk (Amihud and Lev 1981, Morck et al. 1990). These theories
do not exclude the possibility that CEOs occasionally acquire merger targets with low synergies.
However, our approach points out that CEOs may systematically prefer inefficient mergers to
efficient ones and deliberately choose a poor merger target even when they have the opportunity
to aquire a more profitable firm. This finding fits quite well to the conclusion of Williams et
al. (2008) that managers seem to benefit from mergers that are not in their shareholders’ best
interest. Moreover, contrary to our paper, the aforementioned theories cannot explain why the
incomes of the acquiring firms’ CEOs increase and why mergers are often accompanied by a
restructuring of a firm’s compensation system.
Furthermore, our paper contributes to the literature on real authority and project recommen-
dation.5 While we share the basic information structure, our assumptions on authority, veri-
fiability, and contractual form are complementary to those in Dow and Raposo (2005), who
explore the determinants of a CEO’s choice of corporate strategy. With no aspect of corporate
strategy being verifiable, in Dow and Raposo (2005) only the long-term success of the firm
is contractible. The principal-agent relationship is governed by a long-term contract, which is
renegotiated once before the CEO decides which of the strategies to implement. Consequently,
4For an overview see DeBondt and Thompson (1992).
5The seminal papers by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Baker et al. (1999) do not discuss the interplay of project
recommendation and subsequent optimal incentive provision. Moreover, in our paper, the second-stage moral
hazard problem endogenously implies the conflict of interests between principal and agent, which is exoge-
nously given in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Baker et al. (1999).
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renegotiation takes place irrespective of whether a change in strategy occurs or the status quo is
maintained. With our focus on M&A activity, we assume that whether an acquisition occurs is
verifiable by a third party. Moreover, merger management is governed by a separate contract,
which is stipulated only if the principal decided to acquire the merger target proposed by the
CEO. Our sequence of events thus resonates well with the observation that “increases in com-
pensation following a merger are likely to represent a restructuring of incentives to encourage
managers to respond to the challenges of leading a more complex organization” (Williams et
al., 2008, p. 333). Also our suggestion how to manage the arising conflict of interests is novel.
In Dow and Raposo (2005) the conflict of interests is overcome by stipulating an “excessively
high” bonus payment for long-term firm success in the initial contract, which imposes a floor
on the wage the principal can offer in renegotiation. In the optimum, the initial wage is set
sufficiently high such that under renegotiation the CEO is indifferent between a moderate and
a drastic corporate strategy, which prevents withholding of information by the CEO at the cost
of higher bonus payments if no conflict of interests prevails. Our commitment-based resolution
via a sufficiently high acquisition premium is not feasible in Dow and Raposo (2005) where
only long-term firm success is verifiable.
Our result that the principal may find it optimal to pay a high acquisition premium in order
to commit herself not to approve low-synergy mergers is reminiscent of the recent finding by
Berkovitch et al. (2010) regarding organizational design: if project recommendation is sub-
ject to managerial moral hazard, then implementation of the less efficient unitary functional
structure (U-form) may favorably affect the manager’s recommendation behavior by making
projects preferred by the manager too costly to implement, thereby outperforming the more ef-
ficient multidivisional structure (M-form). In Berkovitch et al. (2010), however, the choice of
organizational structure is the only way to influence the manager’s recommendation behavior—
monetary incentive schemes are assumed to be ineffective. Complementary to this approach,
our paper, which endogenizes the manager’s preferences over merger projects, explores infor-
mation management in incentive problems via traditional monetary reward schedules. Further-
more, we go beyond the analyses in Dow and Raposo (2005) and Berkovitch et al. (2010)
by addressing the incentivization of information acquisition in the shadow of the conflict of
interests and how non-monetary means such as working conditions can help to overcome this
conflict.
Our paper is also related to the literature on information management in principal-agent re-
lationships. Early papers in the literature (e.g., Lambert 1986, Demski and Sappington 1987)
consider moral hazard only with regard to information gathering but do not allow for this to be
followed by a moral hazard situation.6 In Lewis and Sappington (1997), the agent first decides
on gathering information about the initially unknown state of the world and, thereafter, chooses
cost-reducing effort. The principal-agent relationship is governed by a single, non-renegotiable
6Moreover, in these papers the agent cannot communicate his information and makes any productive decision
himself.
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long-term contract that covers both information gathering and effort provision. Lewis and Sap-
pington (1997) find that very high-powered incentives are needed to induce effective infor-
mation gathering by the agent.7 In contrast, in our paper the principal-agent relationship is
governed by a series of short-term contracts such that the actual outcome of the gathering of
information affects the form of the subsequent incentive contract. As a consequence, in our
model the principal may prefer to dampen incentives for the gathering of information if the
agent’s second-period rent is large and much information is rather detrimental to the principal
(cf. Section 5.4).
Finally, with the gathering of information requiring costly effort (cf. Section 5.4), our paper
adds to the principal-agent literature on sequential moral hazard with a risk-neutral and wealth-
constrained agent. If an agent exerts effort in two subsequent periods, second-period rents can
be utilized by the principal to optimally design first-period incentives. This effect was first em-
phasized by Schmitz (2005a) and further elaborated by Schmitz (2005b, 2012), Ohlendorf and
Schmitz (2012), and Kräkel and Schöttner (2010). In our setting, contrary to these contribu-
tions, the principal may actually find it optimal to dampen first-period incentives that stem from
prospective second-period rents.
3. THE MODEL
Consider a relationship between a principal (she) and an agent (he)—both risk neutral—that
lasts for two periods, t = 1, 2. The agent is protected by limited liability, i.e., wage payments
to the agent have to be nonnegative in each period. The principal wants to engage in merger-
and-acquisition (M&A) activities, but lacks the expertise and/or the time to run these activities
herself. The agent’s task in the first period therefore is to identify a potential merger target,
i.e. a firm that the principal might acquire. If acquisition takes place and the principal wants to
proceed with the merger, the agent’s task in the second period then is to manage the merged firm.
The probability of the merged firm succeeding in the market depends on both the agent’s effort
and the synergies created by the merger. The agent is offered a new contract in each period. For
simplicity, the agent’s outside opportunity in each period is zero. Moreover, under the absence
of any merger activity, the principal’s business in each period generates a stand-alone profit of
zero.8
M&A information gathering.—At the beginning of their relationship, both principal and
agent know that there are n ≥ 2 potential M&A targets, but they are uninformed about the tar-
gets’ specific M&A synergies. At this point, both parties share the same prior probability distri-
bution regarding the synergies of the potential target firms. Ex ante, all n target firms are identi-
7In the same vein Khalil et al. (2005), who consider the task design problem of Lewis and Sappington (1997)
when implementation costs are not observable, as well as Taylor (1995), who considers a repeated game setting,
assume that information gathering and incentive provision are governed by a single contract.
8By stand-alone profit we refer to the profit a firm generates if it is run according to the current modus operandi
and conducts business as usual.
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cal with the synergies δj of target firm j (j = 1, . . . , n) being drawn from the set {−∞, δL, δH},
where 0 < δL < δH , according to some distribution F with probability P (δj = δ) > 0 for all
δ ∈ {−∞, δL, δH}. In the first period, with probability 1− i, the agent remains completely un-
informed. With probability i ∈ (0, 1), on the other hand, the agent learns about the synergies of
all n merger targets, where the profile of actual synergies is denoted by ∆ = {δ1, · · · , δn}. The
question of whether information gathering was successful as well as the profile ∆ of synergies
in case of successful information gathering are private information of the agent. However, the
agent can send a report r to the principal that points to a specific merger target. The report either
recommends a particular target, r = T ∈ {1, . . . , n}, or nothing, r = ∅. The agent can offer
information on δT to justify his recommendation. While this information makes δT verifiable
for the principal, communication r as well as the information on δT are unverifiable by a third
party. Thus, the agent cannot be forced by the principal to fully reveal ∆ in case of success-
ful information gathering.9 If the agent is indifferent between several targets, we assume that
he will recommend the target with the highest synergies. Moreover, if the agent is indifferent
between making a merger recommendation or not, he will make a recommendation. After the
agent has made his report, the principal decides whether to proceed with the acquisition and (if
so) which target firm to acquire.
M&A synergies.—If the principal acquires a target firm j with negative synergies, δj = −∞,
she will go bankrupt after the first period and suffer an extreme loss of −∞ in the second
period—e.g., from losing everything she owns due to insolvency. In this sense, the mere ac-
quisition of a target firm with negative synergies severely harms the principal’s core business
and forces her out of business.10 If, on the other hand, the principal acquires a target firm j
with strictly positive synergies, i.e., δj ∈ {δL, δH}, she can then, at the beginning of the second
period, choose between running two independent businesses or merging her two businesses. In
the former case, each business generates its stand-alone profit. For simplicity, the stand-alone
profit of a target firm with δj > 0 is set to zero, such that the principal can acquire any such
firm at the end of the first period at no cost, reflecting its market value. If the principal decides
to conduct a merger of her two businesses in order to capitalize on the synergies, then she has
to employ the agent to manage the merged firm—tasks such as identification and realization of
potential cost savings, restructuring of assets, and reconfiguration of the organization all require
managerial effort. The principal cannot replace the current agent by another one, because the
current agent has acquired valuable target-specific knowledge that is not transferable to a new
agent. The merged firm’s success, pi, depends on both the synergies created by the merger and
9The assumption of communication not being verifiable is made for the ease of exposition. Alternatively, we
can think of a setting in which n (i.e., the number of identified merger targets) is stochastic and only the agent
observes the realization of n. In such a setting, the agent can always claim that n = 1 when recommending
target T .
10For example, imagine the case where the acquired firm realizes a huge loss ex post and the principal, as new
owner, is liable for the loss. Alternatively, it is conceivable that the principal is harmed considerably when it
turns out that the acquired firm is involved in criminal activities.
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the second-period managing effort exerted by the agent. The agent’s effort choice, e ≥ 0, is
unobservable for the principal and comes at cost c(e) for the agent, where c′(e) > 0 for e > 0,
c′′(e) > 0, and c (0) = c′(0) = 0. If the agent exerts effort e and the acquired firm exhibits
synergies δ > 0, the merged firm’s profit is high, pi = piH , with probability p(e + δ) ∈ (0, 1),
and low, pi = piL < piH , otherwise. The success probability is monotonically increasing and
concave, p′ > 0 and p′′ < 0. In case of a merger, the agent bears an additional personal cost
κ ≥ 0, i.e., management of the merged firm leads to an additional disutility for the agent.11 If
the principal is indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring the target firm, she will not pur-
sue the acquisition. If the principal is indifferent between a merger or running two independent
businesses, she will pursue the merger.
Contracting.—With the information gathered and communicated by the agent in the first pe-
riod being unverifiable, the first-period contract specifies a wage payment contingent on whether
an acquisition has occurred or not.12 The agent receives w1H in case of an acquisition and w1L
otherwise.13 Regarding the second-period contract, we assume that the merged firm’s success
pi is not verifiable because it is realized in the distant future and thus cannot be used for cur-
rent contracting purposes. Instead, there is a contractible binary performance measure on the
agent’s managerial effort, σ ∈ {σL, σH}. The higher the agent’s managerial effort, the larger the
probability of realization σH of the performance measure: q(e) = P (σ = σH |e) ∈ [0, 1), with
q′(e) > 0, q′′(e) ≤ 0, and q (0) = 0. The performance measure directly refers to the agent’s
activity level but is not affected by merger synergies. For example, if the CEO’s compensa-
tion is equity based, signal σ might reflect short-term changes in the firm’s stock value. These
changes reflect how determined the CEO pursues the merger management, e.g., by renegotiat-
ing supply conditions or thinning out the work force, but do not yet reflect the actual merger’s
effect on long-term firm performance.14 The second-period contract offered by the principal
thus specifies wage payments contingent on the agent’s performance: w2H in case of good per-
formance σH , and w2L in case of bad performance σL. Due to the agent’s limited liability, we
have wtL ≥ 0 and wtH ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2.
Sequence of events.—The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1. At the beginning
of the first period, the principal (P ) offers the agent (A) a contract w1 = (w1H , w1L). If the
agent rejects this contract, the game ends and both parties receive their zero reservation payoff
for each period. If the agent accepts the contract, nature (N ) determines whether he obtains
11This disutility might arise from the agent having to travel frequently between the firm’s headquarters and the
newly acquired firm, which keeps him away from his family or from having to cope with new employees who
doubt his competence and question his authority.
12This assumption is in the spirit of decision-based incentives à la Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). We thus im-
plicitly assume that courts are not willing to enforce message games according to Moore and Repullo (1990).
13Implicitly we assume that it is not contractible immediately after the acquisition of a target firm whether an
actual merger of the two businesses took place. This seems plausible if one thinks of the merger as a long-term
ongoing process of standardizing production and harmonizing work flows over the two businesses.
14It is conceivable, however, that also short-term firm success is already affected by merger synergies. We discuss
such a setting in Section 5.2 below.
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t = 1: information gathering
t = 2: merger management
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
P offers
(w1H , w1L)
A decides
on acceptance
N determines
whether A
learns ∆
A makes
recommendation
r ∈ {T,∅}
P decides
on acquisition,
A obtains wage
P decides
on merging
and offers
(w2H , w2L)
A decides
on acceptance
A chooses
effort e
N determines
realization of σ
P and A
observe σ,
A obtains wage
Figure 1: Timing of events
information about potential merger targets or not.15 Subsequently, the agent hands over a report
to the principal. The principal then decides whether to acquire a target firm and, if so, which
one, and first-period wage payments are made according to contract w1. If the principal does
not acquire a target firm or goes bankrupt after acquiring a target firm with negative synergies,
the interaction of principal and agent concerning the M&A activity is terminated after the first
period.16 In this case, in the second period the agent obtains his zero reservation utility and the
principal either earns zero profits from running only her core business or suffers an extreme loss
from bankruptcy. If the principal has acquired a target firm with strictly positive synergies, the
game continues in t = 2. At the beginning of the second period, the principal decides whether to
conduct a merger or run her two businesses independently. In the latter case, the principal does
not need the agent to manage the merged firm, the interaction of principal and agent concerning
M&A activity is terminated, the agent obtains his zero second-period reservation utility, and
the principal earns zero profits. In the former case, the principal has to employ the agent to
manage the merged firm and offers him a contract w2 = (w2H , w2L). If the agent rejects this
contract, again the interaction of principal and agent ends, and each party obtains a zero payoff
in the second period. If the agent accepts, he decides how much effort e to exert in managing
the merged firm. After nature has determined the realization of the performance measure σ,
15A variant of the model, in which the agent can exert costly effort to improve information gathering, is discussed
in Section 5.4.
16Note that this assumption does not rule out that agent and principal still collaborate on further tasks not consid-
ered in our paper. For example, it is conceivable that (unless in case of bankruptcy) a CEO continues to work
for a corporation, although shareholders and the board have voted against merging.
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second-period wage payments are made according to contract w2.
4. THE ANALYSIS
To facilitate the exposition of the following analysis, we first introduce some further notation.
For a given set ∆ of identified merger synergies, let
∆+ := {δ ∈ ∆|δ > 0} (1)
refer to the subset of identified merger targets generating strictly positive synergies. Within this
subset, let
δ(∆+) := max
δ∈∆+
δ and δ(∆+) := min
δ∈∆+
δ (2)
denote the highest and lowest possible synergies, respectively, that can be realized given the
available information.
4.1. First-Best Solution
As a benchmark solution, we can solve for the first-best second-period effort level which max-
imizes expected net surplus. Under the absence of contractual frictions like asymmetric infor-
mation and limited liability, the principal would implement this effort level. Given that at the
beginning of the second stage a merger occurred with a target firm generating synergies δ > 0,
first-best effort in the second stage, eFB , maximizes expected second-period surplus,
S(e, δ)− κ (3)
with
S(e, δ) := piL + (piH − piL) p (e+ δ)− c (e) . (4)
From the first-order condition, we obtain
piH − piL =
c′
(
eFB
)
p′ (eFB + δ)
(5)
as implicit description of first-best effort as a function of given synergies, eFB (δ).
Suppose that merger synergies have been revealed in the first stage. Given that ∆+ 6= ∅,
efficient merging requires κ ≤ S(eFB(δ(∆+)), δ(∆+)). If this condition is not met, or if ∆+ =
∅, merging is not efficient.
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4.2. Merger Management
Suppose the principal acquired a firm endowed with merger potential δ > 0 and hires the agent
in the second period to manage the merged firm. Given the agent accepted the second-period
contract w2, the agent chooses effort to maximize his expected second-period utility
EU2 (e) = q(e) · w2H + (1− q(e)) · w2L − c(e)− κ. (6)
The agent’s effort choice is then implicitly characterized by the corresponding first-order con-
dition,
w2H − w2L =
c′(e∗)
q′(e∗)
. (7)
The principal chooses w2 to maximize her expected profit,
Π(w2) = piL + (piH − piL)p(e
∗ + δ)− w2L − q(e
∗) (w2H − w2L) , (8)
subject to the incentive constraint (7), the participation constraintEU2 (e∗) ≥ 0, and the limited-
liability constraint w2H , w2L ≥ 0. The function
Ψ(e) :=
c′(e)
q′(e)
q(e)− c(e) (9)
combines EU2 (e) with the incentive constraint (7) and describes the agent’s second-period
expected utility under a binding limited-liability constraint (i.e., w2L = 0) and κ = 0. Note
that Ψ is strictly increasing so that its inverse, Ψ−1, exists. To guarantee strict concavity of
the principal’s objective function Π(w2), in what follows the function Ψ(e) is assumed to be
convex.17 Letting e∗I(δ) being implicitly characterized by
∂S(e∗I(δ), δ)
∂e
= Ψ′(e∗I(δ)), (10)
the following proposition describes the optimal second-period contract and the associated effort
level:
Proposition 1. If
(i) κ < Ψ(e∗I(δ)), then e∗I(δ) is implemented by w∗2H = c′(e∗I(δ))/q′(e∗I(δ)) and w∗2L = 0;
(ii) κ ∈ [Ψ(e∗I(δ)),Ψ(eFB(δ))), then e∗II := Ψ−1(κ) is implemented by w∗2H = c′(e∗II)/q′(e∗II)
and w∗2L = 0;
17If only the participation constraint is binding, then Π(w2) = piL + (piH − piL)p(e∗ + δ) − c(e∗) − κ, which
is always well-behaved. However, if the limited-liability constraint is binding (i.e., w2L = 0), then Π(w2) =
piL + (piH − piL)p(e
∗ + δ)−Ψ(e∗)− c(e∗), so that convexity of Ψ is sufficient to guarantee strict concavity
of Π(w2). Note that for the family of power functions c (e) = eα and q (e) = eβ with α > 1 and β ∈ (0, 1],
Ψ is always convex.
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(iii) κ ≥ Ψ(eFB(δ)), then eFB(δ) is implemented by w∗2H = [c′(eFB(δ))/ q′(eFB(δ))] +κ −
Ψ(eFB(δ)) and w∗2L = κ−Ψ(eFB(δ)).
Moreover, e∗I(δ) < e∗II < eFB(δ).
Proposition 1 shows that the higher the agent’s disutility from merging, κ, the more his limited-
liability constraint is relaxed and the higher will be the effort level implemented by the principal.
If the agent’s disutility from merging is sufficiently small, he will earn a strictly positive rent and
exert only moderate effort (case (i)). If his disutility κ exceeds the threshold Ψ(e∗I(δ)), imple-
mented effort will monotonically increase in κ until a second threshold is reached, Ψ(eFB(δ))
(case (ii)). For this and higher levels of κ the principal induces the agent to choose first-best
effort (case (iii)). Note that the two threshold levels Ψ(e∗I(δ)) and Ψ(eFB(δ)) depend on the
magnitude of the merger synergies.
As an immediate corollary of Proposition 1 we obtain that, if only the limited-liability con-
straint is binding, a decrease in merger synergies strictly increases the agent’s second-period
wage for good performance.
Corollary 1. If κ < Ψ(e∗I(δ)), then dw∗2H/dδ < 0.
The intuition for this finding is rooted in the concavity of the probability function p. The smaller
δ (i.e., the lower the synergies from the merger), the smaller will be the argument of the proba-
bility function, e∗ + δ. Low synergies thus make the agent choose his efforts at a high marginal
productivity level p′. In this situation, the principal benefits much stronger from high-powered
incentives than under high synergies, which are associated with lower values of p′. In other
words, low synergies and, hence, exceedingly poor prospects of the merged firm induce the
principal to create strong incentives to encourage the agent to save the merger project.18 Note
that this effect is not specific to the substitutability of managerial effort and merger synergies
within the probability function p. In Section 5.1, we consider the case of e and δ being comple-
ments in p.
According to Proposition 1, the principal’s second-period profit under merging is
Π(δ, κ) =


S(e∗I(δ), δ)−Ψ(e
∗
I(δ)) if κ < Ψ(e∗I(δ))
S(e∗II , δ)− κ if κ ∈ [Ψ(e∗I(δ)),Ψ(eFB(δ)))
S(eFB(δ), δ)− κ if κ ≥ Ψ
(
eFB(δ)
)
.
(11)
As depicted in Figure 2 and summarized in Lemma 1, the function Π(δ, κ) is nonincreasing and
weakly concave in the agent’s disutility from merging κ.
Lemma 1. For δ ∈ {δL, δH},
(i) ∂Π(δ, κ)/∂κ = 0 for κ ≤ Ψ(e∗I(δ)), and ∂Π(δ, κ)/∂κ < 0 otherwise;
18Similar forces can drive rational self-sabotage in teams, see Kräkel and Müller (2012).
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(ii) ∂2Π(δ, κ)/∂κ2 < 0 for κ ∈ (Ψ(e∗I(δ)),Ψ(eFB(δ))), and ∂2Π(δ, κ)/∂κ2 = 0 otherwise.
Moreover, Π(δL, κ) < Π(δH , κ) for all κ ≥ 0.
Intuitively, for κ < Ψ(e∗I(δ)) the agent obtains a strictly positive second-period rent such that
an increase in κ only reduces this rent but leaves the principal’s second-period profit under
merging unchanged. If κ becomes so high that the agent’s second-period participation constraint
is binding, the principal has to compensate the agent for any increase in κ in order to ensure
his participation such that the principal’s profit decreases in κ. Finally, note that in terms of
second-period profits under merging the principal benefits from higher merger synergies.
κΨ(e∗
I
(δH ))
Ψ(e∗
I
(δL))
Ψ(eF B(δH ))
Ψ(eF B(δL))
Π(δ, κ)
Π(δL, κ)
Π(δH , κ)
Figure 2: Principal’s second-period profit
In order to focus on the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, we assume
that Π(δL, 0) > 0 for the rest of the paper. Note that this assumption does not preclude post-
merger losses in the form of piL < 0.19 After acquisition of a target firm with positive merger
potential δ > 0, the principal can still opt for running two independent businesses, each of
which generates zero stand-alone profits. Therefore, her effective second-period profits after
acquisition of a target firm with δ > 0 is
Π2(δ, κ) := max{0,Π(δ, κ)}. (12)
4.3. Merger Recommendation and Acquisition Decision
At the end of the first period, at date 1.5, for a given first-period contract w1 = (w1H , w1L)
the principal has to decide whether to make an acquisition or not. If the agent does not make
19To see this, note that p(δL)piH + (1 − p(δL))piL > 0 or, equivalently, piL > −piHp(δL)/(1 − p(δL)), is a
sufficient condition for Π(δL, 0) > 0 (where we made use of Ψ(0) = c(0) = 0).
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a recommendation (r = ∅) or recommends a merger with negative synergies (r = T with
δT = −∞), the principal will refrain from making an acquisition in order to avoid the risk of
bankruptcy. If, on the other hand, the principal faces a recommendation r = T pointing to a
merger target with strictly positive synergies δT > 0, she will then acquire the merger target in
question if
Π2(δ
T , κ) > w1H − w1L. (13)
This implies that the principal never acquires the target firm if Π(δT , 0) ≤ w1H − w1L because
the increase in first-period wage cost in case of an acquisition exceeds the increase in second-
period productivity. For w1H − w1L < 0, in contrast, the principal will always acquire the
target firm because even running two independent businesses is more profitable than paying the
high first-period wage w1L if no acquisition takes place. For 0 ≤ w1H − w1L < Π(δT , 0) a
necessary condition to acquire the target firm is that the principal prefers merging over running
two independent businesses. As illustrated in Figure 3, the principal will acquire the target firm
(and subsequently merge the two businesses) if and only if κ < κ˜(δT , w1L, w1H), where
Π(δT , κ˜(δT , w1L, w1H)) ≡ w1H − w1L. (14)
If the agent’s disutility from merging equals or exceeds this threshold, the principal will forgo
acquisition of the target firm because, with the agent’s second-period participation constraint
being binding, from the principal’s point of view the synergies δT do not justify compensating
the agent for his disutility in case of a merger.
κΨ(e∗
I
(δT ))
Π(δT , 0)
Ψ(eF B(δT )) κ˜(δT , w1L, w1H )
Π(δ, κ)
Π2(δ
T , κ)
w1H − w1L
Figure 3: Acquisition decision for 0 ≤ w1H − w1L < Π(δT , 0)
At date 1.4, if the agent succeeded in gathering information (∆+ 6= ∅), he has to decide
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whether to make a recommendation and, if so, what merger target to recommend.20 Restricting
attention (with some foresight) to contracts with a nonnegative first-period wage spread, we
obtain the following result regarding the agent’s reporting decision:21
Proposition 2. Let w1L ≤ w1H and suppose that the agent has identified merger synergies with
∆+ 6= ∅. Then r = T with
(i) δT = δ(∆+) if κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)) and 0 ≤ w1H − w1L < Π(δL, 0);
(ii) δT = δ(∆+) otherwise.
According to part (i) of Proposition 2, if the agent’s disutility from merger management is suffi-
ciently small and the first-period acquisition premium is not too high, he will propose the least
productive merger, δT = δ(∆+), and the principal will be willing to follow this recommenda-
tion. In particular, this means that the agent will go against the principal’s interest whenever
he identifies both low-synergy and high-synergy target firms and recommend a low-synergy
merger. The agent’s incentive to propose the least productive merger is twofold—ensuring a
positive rent and maximizing it. First and foremost, recommendation of the least productive
merger avoids that production becomes too profitable (from the agent’s perspective) and that
the principal implements a high effort level, thereby extracting all rents. In addition, according
to Corollary 1, given the principal does not extract rents to the full, recommendation of the least
productive merger yields a maximum wage for the agent and thus a maximum rent.
In the remaining cases, i.e., part (ii) of Proposition 2, the agent is willing to act in the princi-
pal’s best interest and recommends the most productive merger target he has identified. On the
one hand, this willingness may arise because the agent is indifferent between any recommen-
dation he could make—with the principal extracting all rents or rejecting the recommendation
irrespective of the agent’s recommendation. On the other hand, and more interestingly, this
willingness may also be rooted in the principal’s unwillingness to acquire anything but a high-
synergy target: if Π(δL, 0) ≤ w1H − w1L < Π(δH , 0) and κ < κ˜(δH , w1L, w1H), then the only
way for the agent to obtain the high first-period wage w1H > w1L (and possibly a strictly pos-
itive second-period rent in addition) is to present the principal a high-synergy target. Note that
Proposition 2 implies that the principal always decides to merge when the agent recommends
the least productive target that just avoids bankruptcy, but that she may reject a target when the
agent recommends the most productive one.
Proposition 2 sheds new light on the case of former Daimler CEO Jürgen Schrempp men-
tioned in the introduction. In the light of Proposition 2, Schrempp may not have opted for the
20If the agent did not succeed in gathering information about synergies, he cannot back up his recommendation
with evidence. In this case, irrespective of whether the agent makes a recommendation, the principal will not
make an acquisition to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. If the agent learned about synergies and ∆+ = ∅, he
makes a useless recommendation with δT = −∞ and the principal refrains from acquiring the target.
21As we show in the proof of Proposition 3, it is never optimal for the principal to offer a first-period contract with
w1L > w1H .
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acquisition of Chrysler to realize benefits from empire building, entrenchment, or personal di-
versification. Instead, he aimed at manipulating his post-merger remuneration. By suggesting
a low-synergy target, he made the board choose high-powered incentives, thereby maximiz-
ing his personal rent. This conjecture is in line with the general conclusion of Anderson et al.
(2004, p. 8) that the rise of CEO pay following a merger results from a restructured compen-
sation package meant to encourage the CEO to cope with the challenges of the new complex
corporation.
4.4. First-Period Contracting
At date 1.1, anticipating the agent’s recommendation decision and her own acquisition decision,
the principal offers the first-period contract w1 = (w1H , w1L) ∈ R2≥0 in order to maximize her
expected overall profits
Π1 = Pacquisition{E[Π2(δ
T , κ)|acquisition]− w1H}+ (1− Pacquisition)(−w1L), (15)
where Pacquisition denotes the probability of an acquisition occurring.22
With our focus on first-period contracts with a non-negative wage spread, w1H ≥ w1L, it
follows immediately that the agent (weakly) prefers an acquisition to occur because he then
obtains a (weakly) higher wage and possibly a second-period rent. In consequence, the agent
will, whenever feasible, recommend a target firm with δT > 0 instead of making no recommen-
dation (r = ∅) or a useless recommendation with δT = −∞. The agent’s decision whether
to recommend a target firm with δT = δL or δT = δH , however, does not directly depend on
first-period wages but is governed by the principal’s acquisition decision as well as prospective
second-period rents. According to (13), when faced with a recommendation δT ∈ {δL, δH},
the principal’s acquisition decision is determined by the interplay of the agent’s disutility from
merging, κ, and the difference in first-period wages, w1H − w1L. With absolute levels of first-
period wages playing no role regarding the agent’s recommendation decision, the principal op-
timally sets w∗1L = 0. Let P (δk ∈ ∆) denote the probability that at least one identified merger
target has synergies δk (k = L,H), P (δk ∈ ∆, δj ∈ ∆) denote the probability that at least one
target has synergies δk and at least one other target δj , and P (δk ∈ ∆, δj /∈ ∆) the probabil-
ity that at least one target has synergies δk, but no other target has synergies δj (k, j = L,H;
k 6= j). We obtain the following result for the principal’s optimal first-period contract offer:
Proposition 3. The optimal first-period contract specifies
(i) w∗1L = 0 and w∗1H = Π(δL, 0) if κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)) and
Π(δH , κ)
Π(δL, 0)
> 2 +
P (δL ∈ ∆, δH /∈ ∆) + P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆)
P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆)
;
22Note that participation of the agent is not an issue because of non-negativity of wages due to limited liability.
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(ii) w∗1L = w∗1H = 0 otherwise.
According to Proposition 3, if the agent’s disutility from merging is high, κ ≥ Ψ(e∗I(δL)), the
principal optimally offers a zero first-period fixed wage, w∗1L = w∗1H = 0. Intuitively, since
the agent never obtains a second-period rent, he is, according to Proposition 2, willing to act in
the principal’s best interest and recommend the most productive target firm he identified, i.e.,
δT = δ(∆+). With no need arising to influence the agent’s behavior, the principal economizes
on wage cost as much as possible.
The situation is different if the agent’s disutility from merging is low, κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)). With
the agent recommending the least productive target firm he identified, i.e., δT = δ(∆+), the
principal may actually benefit from offering the agent a sufficiently high wage premium in case
of an acquisition, w∗1H = Π(δL, 0), even though the content (or quality) of the agent’s recom-
mendation itself is not contractible. The reason is that the high acquisition premium acts as
a commitment device for the principal not to acquire any target firm associated with positive
synergies except target firms associated with high synergies. This, in turn, deters the agent
from withholding a high-synergy recommendation and making a low-synergy recommendation
instead because he cannot reap the higher second-period rent associated with lower synergies.
In accordance with these observations, the decision whether the principal offers an acquisition
premium is driven by two effects. First, offering such a premium will be profitable if the higher
second-period profits from a high-synergy merger, Π(δH , κ), are large relative to second-period
profits from a low-synergy merger, Π(δL, 0). Second, the principal will prefer offering such a
premium if it is likely that the agent is tempted not to recommend the most productive acquisi-
tion, i.e., the higher P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆).
5. DISCUSSION
In the following, we address the robustness of our results by considering four natural extensions
of our basic model. First, we consider the case of synergies and effort being complements.
Second, we allow for merger synergies to affect not only the merged firm’s prospect of success
but also the realization of the agent’s performance measure. Third, we assume that the principal
can influence the agent’s personal cost from merging. Finally, we allow for the agent to exert
costly effort in order to improve the gathering of information.
5.1. Synergies and Efforts as Complements
In this section, let the probability of high firm profits be described by p (e · δ). From Proposition
1 we know that the agent’s second-period incentive constraint is given by w2H = c′ (e∗) /q′ (e∗).
If we consider the agent’s effort as the principal’s choice variable, she implements e∗, being
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implicitly described by the first-order condition
(piH − piL)p
′(e∗δ)δ − c′(e∗)−Ψ′(e∗) = 0
with Ψ(e) being defined in (9). Let w∗2H denote the corresponding wage. Thus,
dw∗2H
dδ
=
c′′ (e∗) q′ (e∗)− c′ (e∗) q′′ (e∗)
[q′ (e∗)]2
de∗
dδ
where
de∗
dδ
= −(piH − piL)
p′(e∗δ) + p′′(e∗δ)e∗δ
(piH − piL)p′′(e∗δ)δ2 − c′′(e∗)−Ψ′′(e∗)
.
Hence, sign (dw∗2H/dδ) = sign (de∗/dδ) < 0⇔ p′(e∗δ)+p′′(e∗δ)e∗δ < 0. In words, the result
of Corollary 1 still holds as long as p′ (eδ) + p′′ (eδ) eδ is negative in the relevant range.23
5.2. Interaction between Synergies and Performance Measure
In the basic model we assumed that the agent’s performance measure and, hence, the probability
of a favorable realization of the measure, q(·), is purely effort based. It is also conceivable,
however, that the performance measure (e.g., short-term firm success) may already have been
influenced by the merger synergies. In that case, the probability of a favorable outcome of
the performance measure should increase in the synergies created by the merger. This clearly
creates an incentive for the agent to recommend a merger target with high synergies in the
first period, thereby increasing his likelihood of good performance in the second period. Our
main result, however, may also prevail under these circumstances, i.e., even with successful
merger management being more likely for a more productive merger, the agent may nevertheless
recommend the merger target with the lowest synergies.
For the sake of exposition, let κ = 0 such that the agent’s limited-liability constraint imposes
a binding restriction. Further, let q(e + δ) denote the probability of high second-period perfor-
mance of the agent, which now depends on the sum of effort and merger synergies. Otherwise,
the model is the same as before. Proceeding in analogy to our previous analysis of merger man-
agement (see Section 4.2), the agent chooses second-period effort according to the incentive
constraint
w2H − w2L =
c′(e∗)
q′(e∗ + δ)
. (16)
With the agent’s participation not being an issue, the principal sets w2L = 0 and w2H =
c′(e∗)/q′(e∗ + δ). Considering the effort level as the principal’s choice variable, she imple-
ments e∗(δ), which is implicitly characterized by the first-order condition
(piH − piL)p
′(e∗(δ) + δ)− c′(e∗(δ))−Ψe(e
∗(δ), δ) = 0 (17)
23For an example see the Additional Material.
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where as before Ψ(e, δ) := q(e + δ)c′(e)/q′(e + δ) − c(e) is assumed to be convex in effort e,
Ψee(e, δ) ≥ 0.
In our baseline model, with κ sufficiently low, the agent’s incentive to recommend the least
productive merger arose from the desire to boost his own second-period incentive pay (cf.
Corollary 1). Suppressing the dependency of q(·) and c(·) on effort and/or merger synergies,
we have
dw∗2H
dδ
=
c′′q′ − c′q′′
[q′]2
·
de∗
dδ
−
c′q′′
[q′]2
(18)
where
de∗
dδ
=
Ψeδ(e
∗, δ)− p′′ · (piH − piL)
p′′ · (piH − piL)−Ψee(e∗, δ)− c′′
(19)
and
Ψeδ(e
∗, δ) =
[c′′q′ − c′q′′][(q′)2 − 2qq′′] + qq′[c′′q′′ − c′q′′′]
[q′]3
. (20)
Inspection of (18) to (20) reveals that q′′ ≈ 0 and q′′′ ≈ 0 (i.e., if q(·) is sufficiently flat in the
relevant range) is a sufficient condition for Ψeδ(e∗, δ) > 0, which, in turn, implies de∗/dδ < 0
such that dw∗2H/dδ < 0.
Altogether, the agent’s second-period expected utility (or rent) can be written as follows:
EU2(e
∗(δ)) = q(e∗(δ) + δ) · w∗2H(δ)− c(e
∗(δ)). (21)
Applying the envelope theorem yields
dEU2
dδ
= q′(e∗(δ) + δ) · w∗2H(δ) + q(e
∗(δ) + δ) ·
dw∗2H
dδ
. (22)
Hence, there are two effects that work into opposite directions. The first expression in (22) is
positive and measures the increase in the agent’s success probability if he recommends a merger
target with higher synergies. As discussed in the paragraph before, the second expression in
(22) can be negative so that the agent benefits from lower synergies due to an increase in his
wage payment in case of successful merger management. Note that the first effect is absent in
the model of Section 3. If the second effect dominates the first effect, we will still have the
result that an agent who has identified positive merger synergies prefers to recommend the least
profitable one in order to increase his second-period rent.
To illustrate that second-period incentive pay decreasing in merger synergies may indeed
dominate the first effect, consider the following example. Let q(e + δ) = α · (e + δ) and
p(e + δ) = β · ln(e + δ) with α, β > 0 being sufficiently small to guarantee q, p ∈ (0, 1) in
the optimum. Second-period effort costs are described by c (e) = γ
2
e2 with γ > 0. For this
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specification the agent will focus on the wage-increasing effect of low merger synergies if γ is
sufficiently large so that the optimal effort is very small anyway. In consequence, dEU2/dδ <
0.24
According to the above discussion, if merger synergies do not only affect the success of the
merged firm but also the agent’s performance measure, there are forces at work that dampen
the agent’s incentive to report a low-synergy target if he has also identified a high-synergy one.
If the CEO’s compensation is equity based and short-term firm success is affected by actual
merger synergies, then this observation is in line with the idea stated in Bliss and Rosen (2001)
that CEOs with a greater percentage of stock-based compensation make fewer wealth-reducing
mergers than CEOs with a greater percentage of cash compensation.
5.3. Endogenous Costs of Merging
So far the agent’s personal costs from merging, κ, were assumed to be exogenously given. In
practice, however, the principal can often influence these costs. For example, the principal can
decide how often the agent has to travel between headquarters and the newly acquired firm or
how often and in what detail the agent has to report the progress of merger management. In this
subsection, we allow for the principal to endogenously choose the agent’s working conditions
under merging, κ ∈ [0,∞), at date 1.1 such that the extended first-period contract takes the
form w1 = (w1H , w1L, κ). We assume that if the principal is indifferent between different
values of κ, she will prefer the one that is best for the agent. According to Proposition 3, with
profits under merging (weakly) decreasing in κ (see Fig. 2), there are three candidates for an
optimal first-period contract: (i) w1 = (Π(δL, 0), 0, 0), (ii) w1 = (0, 0,Ψ(e∗I(δL))), and (iii)
w1 = (0, 0, 0).
By stipulating a high acquisition premium, cf. case (i), the principal commits herself to
merge only with high-synergy targets. As we know from Proposition 2, the agent willingly
recommends the most productive merger target in this case. With profits under a high-synergy
merger weakly decreasing in the agent’s personal cost from merging, the principal prefers not
to make the agent’s life harder than necessary and sets κ = 0.
With wages w1L = w1H = 0, cf. cases (ii) and (iii), the principal is generally willing to
acquire both low- and high-synergy target firms. While the principal does not prefer a positive
κ for a given value of merger synergies (because second-period profits are decreasing in κ), she
may nevertheless benefit from choosing a positive κ to influence the agent’s recommendation. In
particular, the principal may be interested in implementing a sufficiently large value of κ in order
to reduce the agent’s rent, thereby preventing him from recommending a low-synergy target in
cases where he identified both low- and high-synergy target firms. According to Proposition 2,
to do so the principal optimally chooses κ = Ψ(e∗I(δL)): while a smaller κ fails to induce the
desired recommendation behavior, a larger κ achieves this goal but decreases profits in case of
24See the Additional Material or Kräkel and Müller (2012) on the specification used in the example.
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a merger.25 Alternatively, the principal may opt for not influencing the agent’s recommendation
behavior, in which case she minimizes his personal merger costs (i.e., κ = 0) as he has to be
compensated for κ under a binding participation constraint.
Comparison of the principal’s ex ante expected profits under these candidate solutions reveals
the following observation regarding the optimal first-period contract, w∗
1
= (w∗1H , w
∗
1L, κ
∗).
Proposition 4. There exist Πmin and Πmax such that:
(i) if Π(δL, 0) < Πmin, then w∗1 = (Π(δL, 0), 0, 0);
(ii) if Π(δL, 0) > Πmax, then w∗1 = (0, 0, 0).
According to Proposition 4, the principal will not make use of κ to influence the agent’s rec-
ommendation decision for rather low or rather high values of Π(δL, 0). On the one hand,
if profits from a low-synergy merger are low, the opportunity cost from adopting the self-
commitment strategy are also low, which makes offering the commitment-based contract w∗
1
=
(Π(δL, 0), 0, 0) optimal. On the other hand, if profits from a low-synergy merger are exceed-
ingly high, the gains from preventing opportunistic recommendation behavior by the agent are
too low to outweigh the opportunity cost associated with the contracts based on commitment or
rent reduction. Consequently, the principal prefers to offer the contract w∗
1
= (0, 0, 0), which
is referred to as laissez-faire contract in the following. For intermediate profits of low-synergy
mergers it is not as clear which contract the principal prefers to offer. A necessary condi-
tion for the principal to directly influence the agent’s recommendation behavior by choosing
κ = Ψ(e∗I(δL)) is that26
Π(δH ,Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)))
Π(δH , 0)
> 1−
P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆)
P (δH ∈ ∆)
[
1−
1
P (∆+ 6=∅)
P (δL∈∆,δH∈∆)
+ 1
]
, (23)
where P (∆+ 6= ∅) ≡ P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆) + P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆) + P (δL ∈ ∆, δH /∈ ∆) de-
notes the probability that the agent identifies at least one target firm with positive synergies, re-
spectively. Thus, there seems to be scope for the principal to put her new contractual instrument
to use, in particular when P (δL ∈ ∆, δH ∈ ∆)/P (δH ∈ ∆) is large. To understand this intu-
itively, suppose that high-synergy targets (if identified at all) are rarely observed exclusively but
mostly together with low synergy targets. Then, under a laissez-faire contract, the agent when
identifying a high-synergy target, will almost always recommend a low-synergy merger instead,
making this contract form rather unattractive. If, in addition, P (δL ∈ ∆, δH ∈ ∆)/P (∆+ 6= ∅)
is small, then the likelihood of identifying low-synergy merger targets is relatively high because
high-synergy targets are rarely identified alone, but given the agent identifies target firms with
positive synergies at all, he will rarely identify both types of target firms at the same time. Since
25Remember that Π(δ,Ψ(e∗I(δL))) > Π(δ, κ) for δ ∈ {δL, δH} and κ > Ψ(e∗I(δL)), see Figure 2.
26See the Additional Material.
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we started from the hypothesis that profits from low-synergy mergers are not too low, a com-
mitment contract also is not overly attractive because low-synergy mergers do not take place
and the respective profits are not realized.
5.4. Endogenous Information Gathering
In the previous sections, we assumed that the agent has no influence on the outcome of informa-
tion gathering. One might imagine, however, that the more effort the agent exerts in information
gathering, the more likely he might identify a target firm that generates positive synergies. We
address this issue by positing a positive relationship between the number of identified merger
targets and the agent’s effort exerted in information gathering. In particular, we will show that
even though implicit incentives created by prospective second-period rents make first-period
incentive provision comparatively easy, the principal may nevertheless prefer to disincentivize
information gathering in order to reduce the scope for opportunistic recommendation behavior
of the agent.
Formally, as before, the probability of the agent becoming informed at all is exogenously
given by i ∈ [0, 1]. However, the number of the target firms the agent identifies in case of
successful information gathering now depends on the effort exerted by him in information gath-
ering, I ∈ {0, 1}, which is chosen at date 1.3:27 if the agent exerts little effort, I = 0, he
identifies only n(0) ≥ 1 target firms, whereas if he exerts high effort, I = 1, he identifies
n(1) > n(0) target firms. His effort choice, whether information gathering was successful, and
the number of identified target firms are private information of the agent.28 Exerting effort I
leads to costs C(I) = C · I for the agent, where C > 0. If the agent is indifferent between high
and low effort, he chooses the effort level the principal wants him to choose. As in the previous
subsections, synergies can take one of three possible values: −∞, δL, or δH . At the beginning
of the game, both principal and agent know that the synergies of any identified merger target
are stochastically independent, where synergies −∞ are realized with probability p0 ∈ (0, 1)
and synergies δk with probability pk ∈ (0, 1) (k = L,H). Given effort I ∈ {0, 1}, the ex-ante
probabilities of no target generating positive synergies, at least one target generating synergies
δk ∈ {δL, δH}, and at least one target generating high synergies without another target generat-
ing low synergies are given by P (∆+ = ∅|I) = pn(I)0 , P (δk ∈ ∆|I) = 1 − (1 − pk)n(I),
and P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆|I) = (1 − pL)n(I) − pn(I)0 , respectively. Finally, to condense the
analysis, we adopt the simplifying assumption of Subsection 5.2 that κ = 0.29 All other as-
sumptions of Section 3 are still valid. Let Ψk := Ψ(e∗I(δk)) with k ∈ {L,H} denote the agent’s
second-period rent.
27The assumption of a binary effort choice is made to ease exposition.
28Here, we could set n(0) = 1 and n(1) = n ≥ 2. This would be in accordance with footnote 9 in Section 3 that
the agent could always claim to have identified only one target firm.
29This assumption rules out cases where the agent never obtains a positive rent in t = 2 such that there would be
no conflict of interests between principal and agent when the latter recommends a merger target.
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Following Proposition 2, we have to distinguish two types of contracts—the commitment-
based contract and the laissez-faire contract. Under a laissez-faire contract with w1H − w1L <
Π(δL, 0) the principal acquires both low-synergy and high-synergy targets. As we will demon-
strate next, it may actually be optimal for the principal in this case to disincentivize information
gathering. Thus, even though prospective second-period rents make incentive provision for in-
formation gathering cheap (maybe even costless), the principal may prefer to deter high effort
by paying the agent a strictly positive wage w1L. To see this formally, suppose the principal
offers w1H − w1L ≥ −ΨH such that the agent prefers a productive merger to not making a rec-
ommendation and recommends the low-synergy target whenever he can. The agent’s expected
utility from exerting effort I is
EU1(w1H , w1L, I) = i{[1− (1− pL)
n(I)][ΨL + w1H ]
+ [(1− pL)
n(I) − p
n(I)
0 ][ΨH + w1H ]}+ [(1− i) + ip
n(I)
0 ]w1L − C · I. (24)
The agent is not willing to exert high effort if EU1(w1H , w1L, 1) < EU1(w1H , w1L, 0), or equiv-
alently,
w1L − w1H > ΨH + [ΨL −ΨH ]
(1− pL)
n(0) + (1− pL)
n(1)
p
n(0)
0 − p
n(1)
0
−
C
i[p
n(0)
0 − p
n(1)
0 ]
=: η. (25)
According to (25), the agent is more inclined to exert high effort if, ceteris paribus, the differ-
ence in first-period wages (w1H−w1L), the minimum second-period rent (ΨH), or the difference
in second-period rents (ΨL −ΨH) is large. Intuitively, exerting high effort in information gath-
ering benefits the agent for two reasons: First, identifying a larger number of merger targets
reduces the probability of identifying only useless targets, thereby making the occurrence of
a productive merger more likely in which case he obtains a second-period rent of at least ΨH
and, if w1H − w1L > 0, even a larger wage payment. Second, a larger number of observations
increases the probability of identifying at least one low-synergy target firm, which benefits the
agent because he then obtains the large second-period rent ΨL instead of only ΨH .
Note that for η > 0, the agent prefers to exert high effort even with no direct incentives in
place, i.e., for w1L = w1H = 0. The principal’s objective then is to maximize her expected
profits,
Π1(w1H , w1L, I) = i{[1− (1− pL)
n(I)][Π(δL, 0)− w1H ]
+ [(1− pL)
n(I) − p
n(I)
0 ][Π(δH , 0)− w1H ]} − [(1− i) + ip
n(I)
0 ]w1L, (26)
subject to the incentive constraint (25), the limited-liability constraint, and the additional con-
straint that −ΨH ≤ w1H − w1L < Π(δL, 0). Suppose η > 0. With wage payments reducing the
principal’s profits, the optimal way to deter high effort is to offer w1H = 0 and w1L = η. The
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principal prefers to deter high effort if Π1(0, η, 0) > Π1(0, 0, 1), or equivalently,
η <
i(p
n(0)
0 − p
n(1)
0 )Π(δH , 0)
(1− i) + ip
n(0)
0
{
(1− pL)
n(0) − (1− pL)
n(1)
p
n(0)
0 − p
n(1)
0
[1− λ]− 1
}
=: Ω˜(λ), (27)
where λ := Π(δL, 0)/Π(δH , 0). A necessary condition for the principal to prefer disincen-
tivizing information gathering is that Ω˜(λ) is strictly positive, which in turn requires that (1 −
pL)
n(0) − p
n(0)
0 > (1 − pL)
n(1) − p
n(1)
0 . Condition (27) thus captures the principal’s primary
rationale to deter high effort: if a low-synergy merger is rather unprofitable compared to a high-
synergy merger (λ small), the principal may prefer the agent to exert low effort if the probability
of the agent recommending a high-synergy target decreases as the number of observations in-
creases.
It remains to analyze whether deterring provision of high effort is optimal not only in the
class of laissez-faire contracts, but also in comparison to commitment-based contracts. In the
appendix we show that the profit under a commitment-based contract is bounded above by
Π1(Π(δL, 0), 0, 1) = i[1− (1− pH)
n(1)][Π(δH , 0)− Π(δL, 0)]. (28)
Given 0 < η < min{Ω˜(λ),ΨH}, it follows from (26) and (28) that the principal indeed prefers
the laissez-faire contract with effort deterrence if Π1(0, η, 0) > Π1(Π(δL, 0), 0, 1), or equiva-
lently, if
η <
iΠ(δH , 0)
(1− i) + ip
n(0)
0
{λ[2− (1− pL)
n(0) − (1− pH)
n(1)]
− [1− (1− pL)
n(0) − (1− pH)
n(1) + p
n(0)
0 ]} =: Ωˆ(λ). (29)
Noting that η > 0 can be made arbitrarily close to zero by the appropriate choice of C, we
compile the above sufficient conditions for effort deterrence to be optimal in the following
Proposition 5. If 0 < η < min{Ω˜(λ), Ωˆ(λ),ΨH}, then the optimal contract stipulates w1H = 0
and w1L = η.
For the conditions in Proposition 5 to be possibly met, we must have that Ω˜(λ) and Ωˆ(λ) are
both strictly positive. Whether this holds or not depends on the parameter values and thus
is unclear in general. For rather extreme values of λ, deterrence of high effort will not be
optimal. If λ ≈ 0, i.e., profits from a low-synergy merger are very low, then Ωˆ(λ) < 0 because
low opportunity costs make the commitment-based contract too attractive.30 If λ ≈ 1, on the
other hand, then Ω˜(λ) < 0 because, with low-synergy and high-synergy mergers resulting in
almost equal profits, a laissez-faire contract with zero wage payments is the better choice for
30Note that 1− (1− pL)n(0)− (1− pH)n(1) + pn(0)0 > 1− [(1− pL)n(0)− p
n(0)
0 ]− (1− pH)
n(0) = 1−P (δH ∈
∆, δL /∈ ∆|0)− P (δH /∈ ∆|0) > 0.
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the principal. As the following parameter specification illustrates, deterrence of high effort may
nevertheless be optimal for intermediate values of λ: for n(0) = 1, n(1) = 5, pL = 0.8, and
p0 = pH = 0.1 it is readily verified that Ω˜(λ) > 0 and Ωˆ(λ) > 0 as long as λ ∈ (0.256, 0.499).
This numerical example also points to the main intuition of why disincentivizing the agent may
be rational for the principal: if the probability of detecting a low-synergy merger is rather high
(here, pL = 0.8), the threat of opportunistic recommendation is considerable. In this situation,
the principal may prefer to mitigate this problem by reducing the number of merger targets
identified by the agent.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we offer a rationale why CEOs systematically prefer to recommend low-synergy
merger targets instead of high-synergy ones when identifying both kinds of targets at the same
time. Since the CEO is protected by limited liability, he may earn a positive rent under the
optimal contract. By recommending a low-synergy target, the CEO increases both his chances
of obtaining a positive rent and, if so, its magnitude. We identify two possible solutions for
shareholders to influence the CEO’s recommendation behavior. First, offering a large acqui-
sition premium to the CEO can serve as a commitment device for shareholders to accept only
sufficiently productive targets. Second, if the CEO’s personal merger costs can be endogenously
influenced via the CEO contract, shareholders can benefit from sufficiently large costs so that
the CEO no longer receives a positive rent. As a consequence, the CEO is not interested in
recommending poor merger targets to manipulate his post-merger remuneration and, hence, his
expected rent.
In our setting, low post-merger profits were allowed to become negative. Together with the
finding that CEOs prefer mergers which ex ante are less likely to succeed, this fits well to em-
pirical cases (e.g., DaimlerChrysler) where merging is indeed value reducing. If we reinterpret
the synergy parameter δ as the CEO’s target-specific ability of running the merged corporation,
a CEO will prefer a merger target for which he is poorly suited at the merger-management
stage, i.e., merging with a business in which he is not an expert, to maximize his post-merger
remuneration. This prediction differs from the traditional entrenchment hypothesis mentioned
in Section 2, according to which CEOs have an incentive to expand in those industries in which
they are experts in order to protect their jobs.
A. PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. We can procede similarly to the proof of Proposition 1 in Kräkel and
Schöttner (2010). Since the incentive constraint w2H = [c′(e∗)/q′(e∗)] +w2L together with
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w2L ≥ 0 already implies that w2H ≥ 0, the Lagrangian can be written as
L (w2L, w2H) = piL + (piH − piL)p(e
∗ + δ)− w2L − q(e
∗) (w2H − w2L)
+ λ1 [w2L + (w2H − w2L) q(e
∗)− κ− c(e∗)] + λ2w2L, (A.1)
with e∗ being a monotonically increasing function of w2H − w2L, implicitly defined by (7).
Computing the partial derivatives with respect to w2L and w2H yields
∂L
∂w2L
= (piH − piL)p
′(e∗ + δ)
∂e∗
∂w2L
− 1− q′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂w2L
(w2H − w2L) + q(e
∗)
+ λ1 + λ1 (w2H − w2L) q
′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂w2L
− λ1q(e
∗)− λ1c
′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂w2L
+ λ2 = 0 (A.2)
and
∂L
∂w2H
= (piH − piL)p
′(e∗ + δ)
∂e∗
∂w2H
− q′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂w2H
(w2H − w2L)− q(e
∗)
+ λ1q(e
∗) + λ1 (w2H − w2L) q
′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂w2H
− λ1c
′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂w2H
= 0. (A.3)
As ∂e∗/∂w2L = −∂e∗/∂w2H , we have that λ1+λ2 = 1, implying that either (i) only the limited-
liability constraint is binding, or (ii) both the limited-liability and the participation constraints
are binding, or (iii) only the participation constraint is binding.
In case (i), λ2 = 1, λ1 = 0, and w2L = 0. Inserting in (A.3) and using incentive constraint
(7) yields
(piH − piL)p
′(e∗ + δ) = c′(e∗) +
q(e∗)
∂e∗/∂w2H
. (A.4)
The comparison with (5) shows that e∗ < eFB, since the second-period surplus function (3) is
strictly concave. Note that, in this situation, the agent earns a strictly positive rent: EU2 (e∗) >
0⇔ Ψ(e∗) > κ with Ψ(e∗) being defined in (9). By using
Ψ′ (e∗) =
c′′(e∗)q′(e∗)− c′(e∗)q′′(e∗)
q′(e∗)2
q(e∗) (A.5)
and the fact that ∂e∗/∂w2H = q(e∗)/Ψ′ (e∗) we can rewrite (A.4) as
(piH − piL)p
′(e∗ + δ)− c′(e∗)−Ψ′ (e∗) = 0. (A.6)
In case (ii), we have λ1, λ2 > 0 as well as w2L = 0 and EU2 (e∗) = 0 ⇔ Ψ(e∗) = κ. Using
again ∂e∗/∂w2H = q(e∗)/Ψ′ (e∗), we can rewrite (A.3) as
λ1 = 1−
(piH − piL)p
′(e∗ + δ)− c′(e∗)
Ψ′ (e∗)
. (A.7)
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Since (due to λ1 + λ2 = 1 and λ1, λ2 > 0) the multiplier λ1 is smaller than one, we must have
that (piH − piL)p′(e∗ + δ) − c′(e∗) > 0. Strict concavity of the second-period surplus function
(3) implies that e∗ < eFB. Combining λ1 > 0 with (A.7) yields
(piH − piL)p
′(e∗ + δ)− c′(e∗)−Ψ′ (e∗) < 0. (A.8)
Note that (piH−piL)p(e∗+δ)−c(e∗)−Ψ(e∗) describes a strictly concave function of e∗ since Ψ
is convex. Hence, the optimal effort in (A.8) is strictly larger than the optimal effort implicitly
described by (A.6).
In case (iii), λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0. Inserting in (A.3) immediately leads to equation (5).
Hence, e∗ = eFB . From the binding participation constraint EU2 (e∗) = 0 and the non-binding
limited-liability constraint w2L > 0 we obtain Ψ(e∗) < κ.
The optimal wages directly follow from the respective incentive, participation and limited-
liability constraints.
Proof of Corollary 1. For κ < Ψ(e∗I(δ)), we have w∗2H = c′(e∗I(δ))/q′(e∗I(δ)), such that
dw∗2H
dδ
=
c′′(e∗I(δ))q
′(e∗I(δ))− c
′(e∗I(δ))q
′′(e∗I(δ))
[q′(e∗I(δ))]
2
·
de∗I(δ)
dδ
. (A.9)
Differentiation of (10) with respect to δ reveals that
de∗I(δ)
dδ
= −
(piH − piL)p
′′(e∗I(δ) + δ)
(piH − piL)p′′(e∗I(δ) + δ)− c
′′(e∗I(δ))−Ψ
′′(e∗I(δ))
< 0, (A.10)
which establishes dw∗2H/dδ < 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. We first prove parts (i) and (ii). Suppose the principal has merged with a
firm associated with synergies δ > 0. For κ ≤ Ψ(e∗I (δ)), the principal implements effort level
e∗I(δ), as defined in (10), which is independent of κ. Hence, Π(δ, κ) is a constant function of κ.
For κ ≥ Ψ(eFB(δ)), the principal implements eFB(δ), as defined in (5), which is independent of
κ, and Π(δ, κ) is linearly decreasing in κ. It remains to show that Π(δ, κ) is strictly decreasing
and strictly concave in κ for κ ∈ (Ψ(e∗I(δ)),Ψ(eFB(δ))). The principal implements effort level
e∗II characterized by Ψ(e∗II) = κ. With de∗II/dκ = 1/Ψ′(e∗II) > 0,
∂Π(δ, κ)
∂κ
= [(piH − piL)p
′(e∗II + δ)− c
′(e∗II)]
de∗II
dκ
− 1
= [(piH − piL)p
′(e∗II + δ)− c
′(e∗II)−Ψ
′(e∗II)]
de∗II
dκ
(A.8)
< 0.
(A.11)
From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that (piH − piL)p′(e∗II + δ)− c′(e∗II)−Ψ′(e∗II) is zero
for e∗II = e∗I(δ) and negative for e∗II ∈ (e∗I(δ), eFB(δ)], which establishes that Π(δ, κ) is strictly
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decreasing in κ. Strict concavity of Π(δ, κ) follows from
∂2Π(δ, κ)
∂κ2
= [(piH − piL)p
′(e∗II + δ)− c
′(e∗II)]
d2e∗II
dκ2
+ [(piH − piL)p
′′(e∗II + δ)− c
′′(e∗II)]
(
de∗II
dκ
)2
(A.12)
together with d2e∗II/dκ2 = −Ψ′′(e∗II)/[Ψ′(e∗II)]3 < 0 (because Ψ′′(e∗II) ≥ 0 by assumption) and
[(piH − piL)p
′(e∗II + δ)− c
′(e∗II)] > 0 (because e∗II < eFB(δ), see Proposition 1).
It remains to establish that Π(δL, κ) < Π(δH , κ). For κ < Ψ(e∗I(δ)),
∂Π(δ, κ)
∂δ
=
[
∂S(e∗I(δ), δ)
∂e
−Ψ′(e∗I(δ))
]
de∗I(δ)
dδ
+
∂S(e∗I(δ), δ)
∂δ
=
∂S(e∗I(δ), δ)
∂δ
= (piH − piL)p
′(e∗I(δ) + δ) > 0, (A.13)
where the second equality follows from the definition of e∗I(δ) in (10). Likewise, for κ ≥
Ψ(e∗I(δ)) and e˜ ∈ {e∗II , eFB(δ)}, we have
∂Π(δ, κ)
∂δ
=
∂S(e˜, δ)
∂e
·
de˜
dδ
+
∂S(e˜, δ)
∂δ
=
∂S(e˜, δ)
∂δ
= (piH − piL)p
′(e+ δ) > 0 (A.14)
where ∂e/∂δ = 0 for e˜ = e∗II , and ∂S(e˜, δ)/∂e = 0 for e = eFB(δ). By parts (i) and (ii) estab-
lished above, the functions Π(δL, κ) and Π(δH , κ) have the same qualitative shape. Therefore
we must have that Π(δL, κ) < Π(δH , κ) for all κ, even though both thresholds Ψ(e∗I(δ)) and
Ψ(eFB(δ)) are shifted to the left if synergies δ increase, i.e.
∂Ψ(e∗I(δ))
∂δ
= Ψ′(e∗I(δ)) ·
∂e∗I(δ)
∂δ
(A.10)
< 0 (A.15)
and
∂Ψ(eFB(δ))
∂δ
= Ψ′(eFB(δ))
(piH − piL)p
′′(eFB + δ)
−(piH − piL)p′′(eFB + δ) + c′′(eFB)
< 0. (A.16)
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 1, we know that if the agent recommends r = T
with δT > 0 and κ < Ψ(e∗I(δT )), then under the optimal second-period contract the principal
implements effort e∗I(δT ), the agent’s participation constraint is slack and he obtains a strictly
positive rent, i.e., EU2(e∗I(δT )) = Ψ(e∗I(δT )) − κ. From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that
Ψ(e∗I(δH)) < Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)).
Note that for w1H ≥ w1L the agent always (weakly) prefers an acquisition to occur because
he obtains a (weakly) higher wage and possibly a second-period rent. Therefore, whenever
feasible, the agent prefers recommending r = T with δT ∈ {δL, δH} over not making a recom-
mendation (r = ∅) or making a useless recommendation r = T with δT = −∞.
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Anticipating the principal’s acquisition decision, the agent chooses whether to make a recom-
mendation and (if so) what recommendation to make in order to maximize his expected utility.
Given ∆+ 6= ∅ and 0 ≤ w1L ≤ w1H , we have to distinguish three cases:
Case 1: Π(δH , 0) ≤ w1H − w1L
Even if the agent makes a merger recommendation r 6= ∅, the principal never acquires the
target firm and the agent always obtains w1L. In consequence, the agent is indifferent between
any recommendation he can make and therefore recommends r = T with δT = δ(∆+).
Case 2: Π(δL, 0) ≤ w1H − w1L < Π(δH , 0)
If κ ≥ κ˜(δH , w1L, w1H), then the principal never acquires the target firm and the agent always
obtains w1L. Consequently, the agent recommends r = T with δT = δ(∆+).
If κ < κ˜(δH , w1L, w1H), then the principal acquires the target firm if δT = δH and does not
acquire the target firm otherwise. Therefore, if δH ∈ ∆+, the agent recommends r = T with
δT = δH = δ(∆+), thereby obtaining w1H (and possibly a second-period rent) whereas any
other recommendation would only yield w1L ≤ w1H . If δH /∈ ∆+, then no recommendation the
agent can make leads to acquisition of the target firm and he always obtains w1L. Therefore, the
agent recommends r = T with δT = δL = δ(∆+).
Case 3: 0 ≤ w1H − w1L < Π(δL, 0)
For δT ∈ {δL, δH}, the principal acquires the target firm for κ < κ˜(δT , w1L, w1H), where
Ψ(e∗I(δH)) < Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)) < κ˜(δL, w1L, w1H) < κ˜(δH , w1L, w1H). (A.17)
If κ < Ψ(e∗I(δH)), then for δT ∈ {δL, δH} the principal acquires the target firm and the agent
obtains a strictly positive second-period rent equal to Ψ(e∗I(δT )) − κ. In both cases the agent
obtains w1H ≥ w1L. Since Ψ(e∗I(δH)) < Ψ(e∗I(δL))—cf. the proof of Lemma 1—the agent
strictly prefers to recommend r = T with δT = δL = δ(∆+) whenever δL ∈ ∆+. The agent
recommends δT = δH = δ(∆+) whenever δL /∈ ∆+.
If Ψ(e∗I(δH)) ≤ κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)), then the principal acquires the target firm for δT ∈ {δL, δH}.
The agent obtains a strictly positive second-period rent for δT = δL whereas for δT = δH the
agent obtains no second-period rent. Since in both cases the agent earns w1H ≥ w1L, he strictly
prefers to recommend r = T with δT = δL = δ(∆+) whenever δL ∈ ∆+. If δL /∈ ∆+, then the
agent recommends δT = δH = δ(∆+).
If Ψ(e∗I(δL)) ≤ κ < κ˜(δL, w1L, w1H), then for δT ∈ {δL, δH} the principal acquires the
target firm and the agent obtains w1H ≥ w1L. The agent does not obtain a second-period rent
in either case. Since the agent is indifferent between δT = δL and δT = δH , he recommends
δT = δ(∆+).
If κ˜(δL, w1L, w1H) ≤ κ < κ˜(δH , w1L, w1H), then the principal acquires the target firm for
δT = δH and the agent obtains w1H ≥ w1L, whereas the principal does not acquire the target
firm for δT = δL and the agent obtains w1L. The agent does not obtain a strictly positive second-
period rent in either case. Therefore, the agent recommends r = T with δT = δH whenever
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δH ∈ ∆+. If δH /∈ ∆+, then the agent obtains w1L irrespective of his recommendation and he
recommends r = T with δT = δL = δ(∆+).
If κ˜(δH , w1L, w1H) ≤ κ, then the principal never acquires the target firm and the agent always
obtains w1L. In consequence, the agent is indifferent between any recommendation he can make
and therefore recommends r = T with δT = δ(∆+).
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we consider first-period contracts with a non-negative wage spread
w∗1H−w
∗
1L ≥ 0. As was argued in the text, the principal optimally sets w∗1L = 0. If the principal
offers w1H ≥ Π(δH , 0), then an acquisition never occurs and Π1 = 0.
If the principal sets w1H ∈ [Π(δL, 0),Π(δH , 0)), then for κ ≥ κ˜(δH , 0, w1H) an acquisition
never occurs and Π1 = 0. For κ < κ˜(δH , 0, w1H) an acquisition occurs if the agent recommends
r = T with δT = δH . According to Proposition 2, if ∆+ 6= ∅, then the agent recommends r =
T with δT = δ(∆+), such that Π1 = i · P (δH ∈ ∆) · [Π(δH , κ)−w1H ]. The optimal wage w1H
to choose for the principal from the range [Π(δL, 0),Π(δH , 0)) is w1H = Π(δL, 0): this not only
minimizes the wage cost in case of an acquisition, but also makes it most likely that the principal
realizes strictly positive profits from M&A because κ˜(δH , 0,Π(δL, 0)) > κ˜(δH , 0, w1H) for all
w1H ∈ (Π(δL, 0),Π(δH , 0)). In summary, for w1L = 0 and w1H = Π(δL, 0),
Π1 =


i · P (δH ∈ ∆) · [Π(δH , κ)− Π(δL, 0)] if κ < κ˜(δH , 0,Π(δL, 0))
0 if κ ≥ κ˜(δH , 0,Π(δL, 0)).
(A.18)
If the principal sets w1H ∈ [0,Π(δL, 0)), then for κ ≥ κ˜(δH , 0, w1H) an acquisition never
occurs and Π1 = 0. For κ ∈ [κ˜(δL, 0, w1H), κ˜(δH , 0, w1H) an acquisition occurs if the agent
recommends r = T with δT = δH . According to Proposition 2, if ∆+ 6= ∅, then the agent
recommends r = T with δT = δ(∆+), such that Π1 = i · P (δH ∈ ∆) · [Π(δH , κ) − w1H ].
For κ ∈ [Ψ(e∗I(δL)), κ˜(δL, 0, w1H)), an acquisition occurs if the agent recommends r = T
with δT ∈ {δL, δH}. According to Proposition 2, if ∆+ 6= ∅, then the agent recommends
r = T with δT = δ(∆+), such that Π1 = i · {P (δH ∈ ∆) · Π(δH , κ) + P (δL ∈ ∆, δH /∈
∆) · Π(δL, κ) − P (∆+ 6= ∅)w1H}. For κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)) an acquisition occurs if the agent
recommends r = T with δT ∈ {δL, δH}. According to Proposition 2, if ∆+ 6= ∅, then
the agent recommends r = T with δT = δ(∆+), such that Π1 = i · {P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈
∆) · Π(δH , κ) + P (δL ∈ ∆) · Π(δL, κ)− P (∆+ 6= ∅)w1H}. The optimal wage w1H to choose
for the principal from the range [0,Π(δL, 0)) is w1H = 0: this not only minimizes the wage cost
in case of an acquisition, but for κ ≥ Ψ(e∗I(δL)), where the agent reports δT = δ(∆+) whenever
∆+ 6= ∅, also makes it most likely that the principal realizes strictly positive profits from M&A
because κ˜(δT , 0, 0) > κ˜(δT , 0, w1H) for all w1H ∈ (0,Π(δL, 0) and δT ∈ {δL, δH}. In summary,
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for w1L = w1H = 0,
Π1 =


i · {P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆) · Π(δH , κ)
+P (δL ∈ ∆) · Π(δL, 0)} if κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL))
i · {P (δH ∈ ∆) · Π(δH , κ)
+P (δL ∈ ∆, δH /∈ ∆) · Π(δL, κ)} if κ ∈ [Ψ(e∗I(δL)), κ˜(δL, 0, 0))
i · P (δH ∈ ∆) · Π(δH , κ) if κ ∈ [κ˜(δL, 0, 0), κ˜(δH , 0, 0)
0 if κ ≥ κ˜(δH , 0, 0).
(A.19)
Comparison of (A.18) and (A.19) reveals that the principal optimally offers w∗1L = w∗1H = 0
for κ ≥ Ψ(e∗I(δL)) (where for κ ≥ κ˜(δH , 0, 0) this statement is without loss of generality
because the principal is indifferent). For κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)), on the other hand, she optimally offers
w∗1L = w
∗
1H = 0 if
i · {P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆) · Π(δH , κ) + P (δL ∈ ∆) · Π(δL, κ)}
≥ i · P (δH ∈ ∆) · [Π(δH , κ)− Π(δL, 0)], (A.20)
or equivalently (making use of the fact that Π(δL, κ) = Π(δL, 0) for κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)))
Π(δH , κ)
Π(δL, 0)
≤
P (δL ∈ ∆) + P (δH ∈ ∆)
P (δH ∈ ∆)− P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆)
, (A.21)
and w∗1L = 0 and w∗1H = Π(δL, 0) otherwise. With regard to (A.21), note that P (δk ∈ ∆) =
P (δk ∈ ∆, δj ∈ ∆) + P (δk ∈ ∆, δj /∈ ∆) (k, j = L,H; k 6= j).
To finally establish the desired result, it remains to show that it is not optimal for the principal
to offer w1L > w1H ≥ 0. In this case, if ∆+ 6= ∅ and the agent recommends a target firm
with δT > 0, then the principal will always acquire the target because Π2(δT , κ) ≥ 0. The
agent, however, will recommend r = T with δT > 0 only if he obtains a second-period rent
and this rent outweighs obtaining the high first-period wage w1L. Formally, the agent prefers
recommending r = T with δT ∈ {δL, δH} over not making a recommendation (r = ∅) or
making a useless recommendation (with δT = −∞) if
κ ≤ Ψ(e∗I(δ
T ))− (w1L − w1H). (A.22)
Now, suppose ∆+ 6= ∅. With Ψ(e∗I(δL)) > Ψ(e∗I(δH)), if κ ≤ Ψ(e∗I(δH))− (w1L − w1H), then
the agent recommends r = T with δT = δL whenever δL ∈ ∆+, and r = T with δT = δH
otherwise. If κ ∈ (Ψ(e∗I(δH)) − (w1L − w1H),Ψ(e∗I(δL)) − (w1L − w1H)], then the agent
recommends r = T with δT = δL whenever δL ∈ ∆+, and makes no recommendation or
a useless recommendation otherwise. Thus, the principal’s expected overall profit for a first-
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period contract with w1L > w1H ≥ 0 is
Π1 =


[(1− i) + i · P (∆+ = ∅)](−w1L)
+ i · {P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆) · Π(δH , κ)
+P (δL ∈ ∆) · Π(δL, 0)
−P (∆ 6= ∅)w1H} if κ ≤ Ψ(e∗I(δH))− (w1L − w1H)
[(1− i) + i · P (δL /∈ ∆)] (−w1L)
+ i · P (δL ∈ ∆) · [Π(δL, 0)− w1H ] if κ ∈ (Ψ(e∗I(δH))− (w1L − w1H),
Ψ(e∗I(δL))− (w1L − w1H)]
−w1L if κ > Ψ(e∗I(δL))− (w1L − w1H),
(A.23)
where we made use of the fact that Π(δL, κ) = Π(δL, 0) for κ < Ψ(e∗I(δL)). Comparison of
(A.19) and (A.23) reveals that for all κ ≥ 0 the principal is better off offering w1L = w1H = 0
instead of w1L > w1H ≥ 0
Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 3, we know that the principal prefers the commitment-
based contract w1 = (Π(δL, 0), 0, 0) over the laissez-faire contract w1 = (0, 0, 0) if and only
if
Π(δL, 0) <
P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆)
P (δL ∈ ∆) + P (δH ∈ ∆)
Π(δH , 0) =: ΠˆL.
Furthermore, the principal prefers the contract w1 = (0, 0,Ψ(e∗I(δL))) based on rent reduction
over the laissez-faire contract w1 = (0, 0, 0) if and only if
i · [P (δL ∈ ∆, δH /∈ ∆) · Π(δL,Ψ(e
∗
I(δL))) + P (δH ∈ ∆) · Π(δH ,Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)))]
> i · [P (δL ∈ ∆) · Π(δL, 0) + P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆) · Π(δH , 0)], (A.24)
or equivalently, making use of the fact that Π(δL,Ψ(e∗I(δL))) = Π(δL, 0), P (δH ∈ ∆) =
P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆) + P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆), and P (δL ∈ ∆) = P (δL ∈ ∆, δH ∈ ∆) + P (δL ∈
∆, δH /∈ ∆),
Π(δL, 0) < Π(δH ,Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)))−
P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆)[Π(δH , 0)− Π(δH ,Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)))]
P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆)
=: Π¯L.
Finally, contract w1 = (Π(δL, 0), 0, 0), based on self-commitment, is better for the principal
than contract w1 = (0, 0,Ψ(e∗I(δL))), based on rent reduction, if and only if
i · P (δH ∈ ∆) · [Π(δH , 0)− Π(δL, 0)]
> i · [P (δL ∈ ∆, δH /∈ ∆) · Π(δL, 0) + P (δH ∈ ∆) · Π(δH ,Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)))] (A.25)
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or equivalently,
Π(δL, 0) <
P (δH ∈ ∆) · [Π(δH , 0)− Π(δH ,Ψ(e
∗
I(δL)))]
(δL ∈ ∆, δH /∈ ∆) + P (δH ∈ ∆)
=: Π˜L.
The desired result then immediately follows by defining Πmin ≡ min{ΠˆL, Π˜L} and Πmax ≡
max{Π¯L, ΠˆL}.
Proof of Proposition 5. To establish the proposition, it remains to derive the upper bound on
the principal’s profit under a commitment-based contract. If the principal offers a commitment-
based contract with w1H − w1L ≥ Π(δL, 0), then the agent recommends the most productive
merger he has identified and the principal acquires only high-synergy targets. The agent’s ex-
pected utility from exerting effort I in the first period is
EU1(w1H , w1L, I) = i[1− (1− pH)
n(I)][ΨH + w1H ]
+ [(1− i) + i(1− pH)
n(I)]w1L − C · I. (A.26)
The agent is willing to exert high effort if EU1(w1H , w1L, 1) ≥ EU1(w1H , w1L, 0), or equiva-
lently,
w1H − w1L ≥
C
i[(1− pH)n(0) − (1− pH)n(1)]
−ΨH . (A.27)
The incentive constraint (A.27) reflects the usual result obtained in models of repeated moral
hazard with a risk-neutral, wealth-constrained agent: prospective second-period rents act as a
reward and punishment for the first period and can therefore be used partially to circumvent
the limited-liability constraint. In our case, the higher rent ΨH , the more motivated the agent
to gather information without being incentivized via w1H . The principal chooses first-period
wages to maximize her expected profits,
Π1(w1H , w1L, I) = i[1− (1− pH)
n(I)][Π(δH , 0)− w1H ]− [(1− i) + i(1− pH)
n(I)]w1L,
subject to the above incentive constraint (A.27), the limited-liability constraint, and the addi-
tional constraint that w1H−w1L ≥ Π(δL, 0). Note that incentive and limited-liability constraints
together imply that the participation constraint is satisfied. Clearly, the principal optimally sets
w1L = 0. Moreover, note that, ceteris paribus, the principal prefers the agent to exert high effort
I = 1, because this increases the likelihood of strictly positive merger profits to be realized.
With w1H being bounded below, the best the principal can thus hope for is the agent exerting
high effort at the minimum wage such that the maximum profit under a commitment-based
contract is Π1(Π(δL, 0), 0, 1) = i[1 − (1 − pH)n(1)][Π(δH , 0) − Π(δL, 0)]. This establishes the
desired result.
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Additional Material / Not for Publication
Example for synergies and effort being complements:
Let q(e) = α · e and p(eδ) = 1 − exp (−βeδ) with α, β > 0 guaranteeing q, p ∈ (0, 1) in the
optimum. In addition let c (e) = γ
2
e2 with γ > 0 and κ = 0. In the second period, the agent
maximizes
EU2 (e) = αew2H −
γ
2
e2,
leading to the incentive constraint αw∗2H = γe∗, and the strictly positive second-period rent
EU∗2 (e) =
1
2
α2
γ
(w∗2H)
2
, which increases in the wage w∗2H . The principal solves
max
w2H
piL + (piH − piL) (1− exp (−βe
∗δ))− αe∗w∗2H
= max
w2H
piL + (piH − piL)
(
1− exp
(
−β
αw∗2H
γ
δ
))
−
α2 (w∗2H)
2
γ
.
The first-order condition leads to
(piH − piL)βδ exp
(
−β
αw∗2H
γ
δ
)
= 2αw∗2H ⇐⇒ w
∗
2H =
γ
αβδ
W
(
(piH − piL)
β2δ2
2γ
)
with W denoting the Lambert W function (or omega function), which is defined as W (x) with
x = W (x) exp (W (x)). Differentiating w∗2H with respect to δ yields
∂w∗2H
∂δ
=
γ
αβδ2
1−W
(
(piH − piL)
β2δ2
2γ
)
1 +W
(
(piH − piL)
β2δ2
2γ
)W ((piH − piL)β2δ2
2γ
)
,
which is negative iff W
(
(piH − piL)
β2δ2
2γ
)
> 1, that is, if (piH − piL)β
2δ2
2γ
is sufficiently large.
(Note that we must have that q(e∗) = αe∗ < 1 ⇔ α2
γ
w∗2H < 1 ⇔ W
(
(piH − piL)
β2δ2
2γ
)
< βδ
α
,
which is always in line with W
(
(piH − piL)
β2δ2
2γ
)
> 1 for α being sufficiently small.)
On the Example in Section 5.2:
Let q(e+δ) = α ·(e+δ) and p(e+δ) = β · ln(e+δ) with α, β > 0 being sufficiently small to
guarantee q, p ∈ (0, 1) in the optimum. Second-period effort costs are described by c (e) = γ
2
e2
with γ > 0. Hence, the incentive constraint is given by w2H = γe/α and the principal solves
max
w2H
piL + (piH − piL)β ln
(
α
γ
w2H + δ
)
− α
(
α
γ
w2H + δ
)
w2H . (A.28)
Since the objective function is strictly concave, the optimal wage w∗2H is described by the re-
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spective first-order condition, leading to
w∗2H =
γ
√
8(piH − piL)
β
γ
+ δ2 − 3γδ
4α
. (A.29)
For a feasible solution, let (piH − piL)β > γδ2. The agent’s second-period rent reads as
EU2(e) = α(e(w
∗
2H) + δ) · w
∗
2H −
γ
2
e(w∗2H)
2
=
(piH − piL)β
4
+
γδ
16
(√
δ2 +
8β
γ
(piH − piL)− 7δ
)
.
(A.30)
Differentiating with respect to δ yields
4β(piH − piL) + γδ
2 − 7γδ
√
δ2 + 8β
γ
(piH − piL)
8
√
δ2 + 8β
γ
(piH − piL)
, (A.31)
which is negative if β2(piH − piL)2 − 24βγδ2(piH − piL) − γ2δ4 < 0. In particular, if γ is
sufficiently large so that the optimal effort is very small anyway, then the agent will focus on
the wage-increasing effect of low merger synergies.
Derivation of Condition (30):
A necessary condition for the principal to directly influence the agent’s recommendation behav-
ior by choosing κ = Ψ(e∗I(δL)) is that Π˜L < Π¯L.
In the following, P (∆+ 6= ∅) ≡ P (δH ∈ ∆, δL ∈ ∆) + P (δH ∈ ∆, δL /∈ ∆) + P (δL ∈
∆, δH /∈ ∆) denotes the probability that the agent identifies at least one target firm with positive
synergies. Furthermore, we use the shorter notation Pi := P (δi ∈ ∆) (with i = H,L), P¬i :=
P (δi /∈ ∆) (with i = H,L), Pij ≡ Pji := P (δi ∈ ∆, δj ∈ ∆) (with i, j = H,L; i 6= j),
Pi¬j := P (δi ∈ ∆, δj /∈ ∆) (with i, j = H,L; i 6= j) and so on. Moreover, let Πi(0) := Π(δi, 0)
(with i = H,L) and ΠH(Ψ) := Π(δH ,Ψ(e∗I(δL))).
We have
Π¯L > Π˜L ⇔
(PHL + PH¬L)ΠH(Ψ)− PH¬LΠH(0)
PHL
>
PH [ΠH(0)− ΠH(Ψ)]
PL¬H + PH
⇔ (PL¬H + PH) [PHLΠH(Ψ)− PH¬L (ΠH(0)− ΠH(Ψ))] > PHLPH [ΠH(0)− ΠH(Ψ)]
⇔ (PL¬H + PH)PHLΠH(Ψ) > [ΠH(0)− ΠH(Ψ)] [PHLPH + PH¬L (PL¬H + PH)]
= [ΠH(0)− ΠH(Ψ)]
(
P 2H + PL¬HPH¬L
)
,
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where the last equality follows from
PHLPH + PH¬L (PL¬H + PH) = PHLPH + (PH − PHL) (PL¬H + PH)
= PHLPH + PH (PL¬H + PH)− PHLPL¬H − PHLPH
= P 2H + PL¬H (PH − PHL)
= P 2H + PL¬HPH¬L.
The inequality
(PL¬H + PH)PHLΠH(Ψ) > [ΠH(0)− ΠH(Ψ)]
(
P 2H + PL¬HPH¬L
)
can be rewritten as follows:
(PL¬H + PH)PHLΠH(Ψ) > [ΠH(0)− ΠH(Ψ)]
(
P 2H + PL¬HPH¬L
)
⇔ ΠH(0)
(
P 2H + PL¬HPH¬L
)
< ΠH(Ψ)
[
(PL¬H + PH)PHL + P
2
H + PL¬HPH¬L
]
= ΠH(Ψ)
[
PL¬H (PHL + PH¬L) + PHPHL + P
2
H
]
= ΠH(Ψ)
[
PH (PL¬H + PHL) + P
2
H
]
= ΠH(Ψ)PH (PL + PH)
or equivalntly,
ΠH(Ψ)
ΠH(0)
>
P 2H + PL¬HPH¬L
PH (PL + PH)
=
P 2H + (PL − PLH) (PH − PHL)
PH (PL + PH)
=
P 2H + PHPL − (PL + PH)PHL + P
2
HL
PH (PL + PH)
= 1−
(PL + PH)PHL − P
2
HL
PH (PL + PH)
= 1−
PHL
PH
PL + PH − PHL
PL + PH
= 1−
PHL
PH
[
1−
PHL
PL + PH
]
.
Since
PL + PH = (PL¬H + PLH) + (PH¬L + PHL)
= (PL¬H + PH¬L + PLH) + PLH = P (∆+ 6= ∅) + PLH ,
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we obtain
ΠH(Ψ)
ΠH(0)
> 1−
PHL
PH
[
1−
PHL
PL + PH
]
⇔
ΠH(Ψ)
ΠH(0)
> 1−
PHL
PH
[
1−
1
P (∆+ 6=∅)
PHL
+ 1
]
.
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